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 Abstract 
 
Humanitarian organizations are fundamentally concerned with addressing the suffering of 
civilians. The decision by an armed actor to resort to force can result in greater protection or 
greater harm, and this decision has at least as significant an impact on civilian lives as any 
decision made during the conduct of hostilities. Yet, humanitarian organizations rarely publicly 
advocate for or against the use of force. This article explores the perceived and actual limitations 
that humanitarian principles place on the public advocacy of humanitarian organizations 
regarding the recourse to force. It begins with a discussion of the relevant legal framework and 
explication of the fundamental humanitarian principles.  It then goes on to discuss the political 
and operational implications for humanitarian organizations that choose to speak out, and 
outlines the issues that these organizations may consider when choosing to adopt a public 
position on the use of force. 
  
I. Introduction 
 
Humanitarian organizations play a central role in addressing the urgent needs of the civilian 
population during armed conflict.  Operating frequently in highly insecure environments, these 
organizations run programming designed to meet the basic needs of civilians, who most often 
bear the brunt of hostilities.  Central to the mission and echoed in the mandate of most of these 
organizations is the guiding force of the humanitarian principles.  
 
The term “humanitarian principles” is used by different actors, all with varying goals, to refer to 
a variety of values and norms.  In the context of the provision of humanitarian assistance during 
armed conflict, there are four main principles that fall under this heading:  humanity, neutrality, 
impartiality, and independence. 1   Though international humanitarian law (“IHL”), the legal 
framework that applies to situations of armed conflict, makes explicit reference only to humanity 
and impartiality, treaty commentary and general practice reference all four principles. Subsidiary 
to these four main principles are those of voluntary service, unity, and universality; all of these 
principles are found in the Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement.2  Although these four fundamental principles are specific to the movement 
itself, they have been widely adopted by numerous humanitarian organizations and have been 
reaffirmed in United Nations Resolutions, industry codes of conduct, and best practices.3 
 
                                                 
1
 See, e.g., Elizabeth Ferris, The Politics of Protection: The Limits of Humanitarian Action, at 11(2011). 
2
 Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, Statutes of the International 
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, adopted by the 25th International Conference of the Red Cross, Geneva 
(1986),  available at https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/red-cross-crescent-movement/fundamental-
principles-movement-1986-10-31.htm.   
3
 The four main principles were articulated at the 20th International Conference of the Red Cross in 1965 and 
subsequently reaffirmed in the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, adopted in 
1986.  See The Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (1986), available 
at https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/red-cross-crescent-movement/fundamental-principles-movement-
1986-10-31.htm.  See also A. Res. 46/182 (1991); G.A. Res. 58/114 (adopted Dec. 17, 2003) (dist. Feb. 5, 2004).  
They are also found in the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief.  See generally Code of Conduct for the International Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief (1994), 
available at https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/p1067.htm.  
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 For organizations that commit to act in accordance with the main humanitarian principles, these 
principles guide many important legal, policy, and operational decisions.  Strict adherence to the 
principles can be challenging, particularly in the often politically charged and volatile conditions 
of armed conflict.  Nonetheless, observance of these principles is important for a number of 
reasons.  Organizations that are humanitarian and impartial benefit from a privileged position 
under IHL, and as such, their offers of assistance are not to be regarded as interference in the 
sovereign affairs of a state.  Organizations that act in accordance with the principles may benefit 
from an advantageous negotiating position vis-à-vis parties to the conflict when trying to obtain 
access to the civilian population.  Similarly, adherence to the principles is often important for 
ensuring staff and beneficiary safety, which is fundamental to stable and predictable 
programming.  Lastly, these principles are critical to perceptions of the organizations; actors – 
particularly parties to the conflict – are often more inclined to allow access to civilians if the 
parties view the humanitarian organization as acting in accordance with the principles of 
neutrality, independence, and impartiality. 
 
In the course of their efforts, humanitarian organizations rarely make public statements 
supporting or opposing the use of force by a single actor (whether it is a state, armed group, 
regional body, or the United Nations) in an actual or putative armed conflict (though it is not 
unusual for humanitarian organizations to generally promote peaceful conflict resolution and call 
on all parties to agree to ceasefires).4  This reticence is not a matter of legal obligation, but may 
be a consequence of the organization’s commitment to principled action – in particular its 
commitment to neutrality.  What follows is an examination of whether this silence is required by 
the humanitarian principles, and if a humanitarian organization may still publicly support or 
oppose the use of force by an armed actor while remaining faithful to the principles (both in 
terms of an organization’s self-identification and others’ perceptions of the organization).  
Section II of this Article situates the humanitarian principles within the framework of 
international law and humanitarian practice and discusses the reasons that organizations choose 
to comply with them.  Section III, outlines the implications of taking a public position on the 
recourse to force for each of the four fundamental humanitarian principles and concludes that 
only the principle of neutrality may require silence on the use of force by a single armed actor.  
Section IV articulates some of the considerations that humanitarian organizations may take into 
account when deciding whether or not to speak out on the use of force.  The article ends by 
concluding in Section V that while public advocacy for or against the use of force may be 
morally compelling in some situations, the considerations outlined in Section IV, considered 
together with operational challenges and risks to programs, partners, and staff make it 
particularly difficult for humanitarian organizations to adopt a public position.   
 
II. Humanitarian Principles and International Humanitarian Law 
 
It is important to begin with an understanding of the relationship between the humanitarian 
principles, humanitarian assistance in armed conflict, and IHL.  IHL is the legal framework 
applicable to international and non-international armed conflict.  It is understood as  
                                                 
4
 Our discussion of the use of force in this Article relates exclusively to calls on a single party or a single side in a 
particular situation, rather than calls on all sides to end or refrain from engaging in combat.  See, e.g. 34 
organizations call for a ceasefire and sustained solution towards peace, (11 July 2014) available at 
http://mcc.org/sites/mcc.org/files/media/common/documents/34organizationscallforceasefire.pdf.  
2
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[I]nternational rules, established by treaties or custom, which are 
specifically intended to solve humanitarian problems directly 
arising from international or non-international armed conflicts and 
which, for humanitarian reasons, limit the right of Parties to a 
conflict to use the methods and means of warfare of their choice or 
protect persons and property that are, or may be, affected by 
conflict.5 
 
The primary treaties that serve as the foundation of the legal framework are the four Geneva 
Conventions and their first two Additional Protocols.6  Other treaties that proscribe specific 
weapons or means and methods of warfare also form the basis of IHL.  Customary international 
humanitarian law (“CIHL”) is likewise important for the regulation of the behavior of the parties 
to a conflict.7  Specific IHL treaties may apply only to international or non-international armed 
conflicts; however, many of the rights, responsibilities, and obligations enshrined in treaties may 
nonetheless be applicable to both international and non-international armed conflict as rules of 
CIHL.  For instance, it is widely accepted that under CIHL  
  
[P]arties to the conflict must allow and facilitate rapid and 
unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief for civilians in need, 
which is impartial in character and conducted without any adverse 
distinction, subject to their right of control.8 
 
Though the obligation to allow and facilitate humanitarian access in the event of demonstrable 
need on the part of the civilian population (subject to security considerations) appears in the 
Fourth Geneva Convention, Additional Protocol I (applicable to international armed conflict),9 
and Additional Protocol II (applicable to non-international armed conflict),10 in a number of 
contemporary conflicts these treaty provision would have been inapplicable.    
 
                                                 
5
 Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski, & Bruno Zimmerman (eds.), Commentary - Introduction to the Commentary 
on the Additional Protocols I and II of 8 June 1977, p. xxvii (1987). 
6
 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 
[hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]; Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; Protocol Additional 
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II].  The third 
Protocol is not relevant to this examination but for the sake of completeness is cited here.  Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem 
(Protocol III), Dec. 8, 2005, 2404 U.N.T.S. 1.      
7
 See Statute of the International Court of Justice (hereinafter ICJ), Art. 38. 
8
 Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Rule 55 (2005).   
9
 See, e.g., Arts. 23, 59 Fourth Geneva Convention 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Art. 70, Additional Protocol I 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. 
10
 See Art. 18, Additional Protocol II 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. 
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 Take the case of Syria, which has recently witnessed a non-international armed conflict (as well 
as arguably a concomitant international conflict).  Conduct relating to the non-international 
conflicts in Syria is not governed by the Fourth Geneva Convention, which applies only to 
international conflicts, or by Additional Protocol II,11 to which Syria is not a State Party.12  
However, many of the provisions found in Additional Protocol II, including those related to 
humanitarian assistance, are reflected in rules of CIHL.13  Thus, the parties to the conflict are 
bound by much of what is found in Additional Protocol II, but the legal obligation is based on its 
status as rules of CIHL rather than its status as treaty law.  Consequently, when determining 
rights, responsibilities, and obligations in the context of IHL, both treaty and customary law are 
appropriate sources of authority for determining the rules that regulate the behavior of both states 
and non-state armed groups during armed conflict. 
 
Under IHL, humanitarian assistance is generally defined in a narrow manner, and is understood 
to include relief that is focused on basic, life-saving materials such as; food, medical supplies, 
and shelter.14  Central to the provision of such assistance is the notion of predictable, sustainable, 
and safe access to the civilian population being served.  Such access is considered to be a 
“fundamental prerequisite for humanitarian action and protection[;] and for millions of 
vulnerable people caught in conflicts it is often the only hope and means of survival.” 15  
Engagement with the parties to the conflict who control access to the territory where the 
beneficiary communities are located is critical to the efforts of the United Nations (“UN”), the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”), and non-governmental organizations 
(“NGO”) seeking to provide humanitarian assistance.   
 
Parties to the armed conflict decide whether to grant access to humanitarian organizations based 
on a mélange of legal, policy, and ethical considerations.  Central among these considerations is 
whether an organization’s sole motive is to help the civilian population.  Another important 
consideration is whether granting access would yield a military advantage to the adversary.  
Publicly declaring allegiance to humanitarian principles – and acting demonstrably in concert 
with them – helps humanitarian actors make their case for humanitarian access.  However, 
adherence to the principles is not straightforward, and can be fraught with apparent 
contradictions.  How these principles are conceptualized by law provides understanding for how 
humanitarian actors can operationalize them in practice to resolve these apparent contradictions.   
 
                                                 
11
 See common Art. 2 and common Art. 3 of all four Geneva Conventions for the material scope of the Geneva 
Conventions. 
12
 For a list of states parties see ICRC, Treaties and State Parties to Such Treaties, available at 
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_NORMStatesParties&xp_treatySelected=
475. 
13
 See, e.g., Additional Protocol II, Art. 18(2) (“If the civilian population is suffering undue hardship owing to a lack 
of the supplies essential for its survival, such as foodstuffs and medical supplies, relief actions for the civilian 
population which are of an exclusively humanitarian and impartial nature and which are conducted without any 
adverse distinction shall be undertaken subject to the consent of the High Contracting Party concerned.”). 
14
 See, e.g., Fourth Geneva Convention, Art. 55 (referring to “necessary foodstuffs, medical stores”); Additional 
Protocol I, art. 69 (listing “clothing, bedding, means of shelter, other supplies essential to the survival of the civilian 
population”), Additional Protocol II, art. 18 (referring to “supplies essential for its survival, such as foodstuffs and 
medical supplies”).  
15
 U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: Rep. of 
the Secretary-General, S/2010/579 (Nov. 11, 2010).  
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 It is important to note that humanitarian organizations such as Médécins Sans Frontières, Save 
the Children, Mercy Malaysia, and Oxfam are not bound by IHL.  Similarly, the seven 
Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement are compulsory only for 
those national societies.16   Strictly speaking, humanitarian organizations are not bound by IHL 
and are therefore not under a legal obligation to adhere to these principles;17 any commitments 
by organizations to do so are not legally enforceable under international law.  It follows that no 
NGO is legally obligated to remain silent on the use of force by an armed actor.  
 
Notwithstanding the fact that humanitarian organizations (apart from the ICRC and National 
Movement) are not legally bound to adhere to the humanitarian principles, these same 
organizations undoubtedly have significant incentive to abide by them. 18   Under IHL, the 
activities these organizations seek to undertake are privileged as humanitarian relief if they are 
“humanitarian and impartial in character and conducted without any adverse distinction.”19  
Furthermore, humanitarian organizations generally must maintain their impartial character in 
order to retain the privileges bestowed upon “impartial humanitarian organization[s]” that are 
referenced numerous times in the four Geneva Conventions. 20   These provisions push 
organizations to be impartial and humanity-driven, in large part due to their inherent normative 
appeal and the practical benefits of the legal privileges enjoyed by organizations that meet the 
conditions.  However, the strongest reasons for an organization to abide by its commitments to 
humanitarian principles may be operational.  Delivering humanitarian assistance in a principled 
fashion is critical for both operational security (in terms of staff and beneficiary safety) and 
operational effectiveness (in terms of program sustainability and predictability).      
 
Since humanitarian organizations act in a principled manner for both principled and pragmatic 
reasons, it is impossible to discern from their conduct alone why so many of them categorically 
abstain from publicly supporting or opposing the use of force by an armed actor.  They may 
believe that their commitments to humanitarian principles require their abstention or they may 
believe it is simply expedient and practical to do so in order to ensure there are no risks to their 
operations.  It is also possible that organizations simply do not confront the question, given the 
general thrust of humanitarian principles and the risk to programs and staff sometimes associated 
with taking on controversial issues.  
 
Yet, the decision to use military force by an armed actor is often the most consequential of all for 
civilians that are or would be affected by armed violence.  The humanitarian imperative may 
actually compel principled organizations to speak out either for, or against military action – if 
they were not inhibited by other legal or ideological commitments or their operational realities.  
                                                 
16
 The International Committee of the Red Cross is unique in so far as it is endowed with legal personality under 
international law.  See, e.g., Gabor Rona, The ICRC's status: in a class of its own (2004) available at 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/5w9fjy.htm. 
17
 NGOs are not subjects of international law, and therefore, are not bound by international law.  See, e.g., Boleslaw 
Adam Boczek, International Law: A Dictionary, at 76 (2005).   
18
 To the extent any such commitment is made in the context of a contract with a donor or grantor, there could exist 
an argument that there is a legal basis for such an obligation.  Such a basis, however, is grounded in contract law and 
not IHL. 
19
 Art. 70, Additional Protocol I. 
20
 See, e.g., The “right of initiative” under Common Art. 3 of the Geneva Conventions.  
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 To that end, an understanding of what humanitarian principles actually require of their adherents 
is long overdue.   
 
A. Humanity 
 
Humanity is defined as the imperative to “prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may 
be found.”21  The underlying purpose of the principle is to “protect life and health and to ensure 
respect for the human being. It promotes mutual understanding, friendship, cooperation and 
lasting peace amongst all peoples.”22  It is linked closely to the qualifier “humanitarian” in the 
context of organizations providing relief within the framework of IHL.  Humanitarian is 
described in the Commentaries to the Geneva Conventions as “being concerned with the 
condition of man considered solely as a human being, regardless of his value as a military, 
political or professional or other unit.”23  It refers more to the motivation for offering assistance, 
rather than the manner in which the assistance is carried out.24  
 
In the seminal case Nicaragua v. United States before the International Court of Justice, the 
Court endeavored to delineate what would be considered humanitarian assistance under 
international law.  The Court stated 
 
An essential feature of truly humanitarian aid is that it is given 
‘without discrimination’ of any kind.  In the view of the Court, if 
the provision of ‘humanitarian assistance’ is to escape 
condemnation as an intervention in the internal affairs of [a 
country], not only must it be limited to the purposes hallowed in 
the practice of the Red Cross, namely ‘to prevent and alleviate 
human suffering,’ and ‘to protect life and health and ensure respect 
for the human being’; it must also, and above all, be given without 
discrimination to all in need [in the country], not merely to one 
[side] and their dependents.25 
 
This description has been criticized, however, as failing to account for the nature of humanitarian 
principles and the operational realities in which they are exercised.26  Generally speaking, neither 
the principles of neutrality or impartiality, nor state practice, require that assistance be provided 
to all sides in a conflict for the assistance to be deemed humanitarian, since organizations may 
find that civilians on one side are in greater need or easier to access.  Thus, the principle of 
humanity and the humanitarian character of humanitarian assistance must be assessed in the 
context of other humanitarian principles and the practical obstacles that organizations face.   
                                                 
21
 The Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, supra, note 2. 
22
 Id.   
23
 Jean S. Pictet, Commentary at 96,  available at https://www.icrc.org/ihl/COM/380-600013?OpenDocument 
24
 Mackintosh, The Principles of Humanitarian Action in International Humanitarian Law, HPG Report, at 7 (Mar. 
2000). 
25
 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Merits), I.C.J. Reports 243 (27 
June1986). 
26
 See, e.g., Kalshoven, Impartiality and Neutrality in Humanitarian Action, 29 International Review of the Red 
Cross (Dec. 1989); Mackintosh, The Principles of Humanitarian Action in International Humanitarian Law, HPG 
Report (Mar. 2000). 
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B. Impartiality 
 
An impartial organization “makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, 
class or political opinions.  It endeavors to relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided 
solely by their need, and to give priority to the most urgent cases of distress.”27  The principle of 
impartiality requires that assistance be provided based on need and priority alone and not 
“prejudice . . . [or] considerations regarding the person . . . to whom he gives or refuses 
assistance.”28   This principle encompasses three elements.29  The first is the concept of non-
discrimination, which requires that no adverse distinction be made on such grounds as 
nationality, race, religion or political affiliation.  The second is proportionality, which requires 
that assistance be provided based on need alone.  Last is the concept of “impartiality proper” 
which demands that those providing assistance make no subjective distinction; meaning all those 
in need are “equally entitled to help, whether they are good or bad, innocent victims or persons 
guilty of hideous war crimes.”30  It is understood that if programming is undertaken in only a 
specific area due to operational limitations, the principle of impartiality is not necessarily 
violated; but “the aspirations the principles . . . must continue to be implemented to the 
maximum extent.”31   This demonstrates that just as the principle of humanity is defined in 
relation to impartiality, the reverse is equally true.  
 
C. Independence 
 
Independence in the context of humanitarian action requires that the organization remain 
autonomous from any “political, economic, military or other objectives any actor may hold with 
regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented.”32  The principle has been 
described in the context of the ICRC as requiring that the ICRC “be sovereign in its decisions, 
acts and words . . . it is not admissible for any power . . . to make it deviate from the line 
established for it by its ideals.”33  The principle has serious consequences for operations as it 
requires that organizations not allow their activities to be affected by funding considerations, 
political concerns, or military goals.  Demonstrable independence from donors (and political, 
economic or military goals of donors) and operational transparency are critical to establishing an 
organization’s independence.     
 
 
 
                                                 
27
 The Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, supra, note 2. 
28
 Jean S. Pictet ed., Commentary: Convention (II) Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1960), 68-69. 
29
 See Kalshoven, supra note 26, at 520; The Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement (1986), supra note 2; Françoise Bouchet-Saulnier, The Practical Guide to Humanitarian Law, 
218-19 (2007).    
30
 Kalshoven, supra note 26, at 520. 
31
 Id.  
32
 G.A. Res. 58/114, supra note 3.  See also, World Humanitarian Summit, 23 Principles and Good Practice of 
Humanitarian Donorship, 2003 (endorsed 17 June 2003) available at 
http://www.worldhumanitariansummit.org/node/434472; Bouchet-Saulnier, supra note 29, at 218. 
33
 Denise Plattner, ICRC Neutrality and Neutrality in Humanitarian Assistance, International Review of the Red 
Cross 4 (Apr.1996). 
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 D. Neutrality 
 
Neutrality is understood in the context of humanitarian assistance as requiring an organization to 
abstain from “[taking] sides in hostilities or [engaging] at any time in controversies of a political, 
racial, religious or ideological nature” so as to “continue to enjoy the confidence of all [the 
parties to a conflict.]” 34  Critical to the principle of neutrality is “getting the parties to the 
conflict to accept that, by nature, relief actions are not hostile acts, nor are they de facto 
contributions to the war efforts of one of the belligerents.”35   
 
The principle has also been described as “a necessary negative complement to the essentially 
positive notion of impartiality.”36  It has a dual meaning in so far as it precludes an organization 
from engaging in hostilities (directly or indirectly) in favor of either side (military neutrality), 
and prohibits an organization from engaging in controversies of a political, racial, religious, or 
ideological nature (political neutrality).37 
 
It may be understood as an operational principle that is a means to an end, rather than an end in 
itself.38  This is because the objective of staying distant from contending parties or ideologies is 
so that the parties will trust the organization, which is critical to being able to operate safely, 
effectively and predictably.39 
 
The principle of neutrality has evolved to arguably allow for the denunciation of serious 
violations of IHL. 40   It is suggested that such public statements are not to be viewed as 
engagement of a political or ideological nature in the conflict, and as such are exempt from the 
restrictions of the principle of neutrality.  As explained by one author, “[h]ardly a burden, 
neutrality is instead viewed as truly liberating.  Since no belligerent is beyond reproach, 
neutrality allows criticism of whatever side requires it.”41  It allows for a principled position to 
be retained amidst highly politicized conditions. 
 
Despite its centrality to humanitarian action in practice and popular imagination, neutrality is not 
referenced in the text of the Geneva Conventions.  Furthermore, there are a number of 
organizations considered to be humanitarian organizations that do not subscribe to this principle.  
For example, Oxfam does not subscribe to the principle of neutrality as it is commonly 
understood and described in this article.42  In accordance with its “rights-based approach” to 
humanitarian assistance, Oxfam views confrontations with injustice, however politically 
controversial, to be central to its humanitarian mission.  Oxfam is also wary of the possibility 
                                                 
34
 The Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, supra, note 2. 
35
 Bouchet-Saulnier, supra note 29, at 219.     
36
 Kalshoven, supra note 26, at 520. 
37
 Plattner, supra note 33, at 4. 
38
 Larry Minear, The Theory and Practice of Neutrality: Some Thoughts on the Tensions, 830 International Review 
of the Red Cross 3 (31 Mar.1999); Bouchet-Saulnier, supra note 29, at 220.     
39
 See Marion Harroff-Travel, Neutrality and Impartiality - The Importance of these Principles for the International 
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and the Difficulties Involved in Applying Them, 29 International Committee 
of the Red Cross 537 (Dec. 1989). 
40
 See, e.g., Bouchet-Saulnier, supra note 29, at 219.    
41
 Minear, supra note 38, at 3; Bouchet-Saulnier, supra note 29.   
42
 Oxfam’s Role in Humanitarian Action (2013), available at 
https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/hpn-role-humanitarian-action-010613-en.pdf 
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 that silence or attempts at even-handedness in controversial debates might be perceived by 
beneficiaries as complicity or indifference to injustice – precisely the sort of perception that 
neutrality is meant to avoid. 
 
III.  Implicating Humanitarian Principles by Speaking Out 
 
Given that the use of force by States and armed groups significantly impacts civilians, it is 
understandable that humanitarian organizations (whether neutral or non-neutral) might feel 
compelled to speak out publicly – either in favor of, or against the use of force.  In so doing, 
humanitarian organizations must tread carefully to maximize their positive impact on civilians 
while maintaining their adherence to the humanitarian principles. 
 
A.   Implications for the Principle of Humanity 
 
In considering whether to adopt a public position vis-à-vis the use of force by an actor, an 
organization must be cautious not to jeopardize its privileged position under IHL.  It is difficult 
to imagine a realistic scenario in which a humanitarian organization violates the principle of 
humanity by coming out against the use of force.  Some accounts of the principle of humanity 
suggest that it also incorporates the “do no harm” principle imported from medical ethics.43  It is 
important to note that most scholarly literature on “do no harm” in the humanitarian context 
focuses on the net creation of harm by aid workers, most notably by fueling and perpetuating 
conflict – in other words, aid interventions that failed to “do less harm.”44   
 
More relevant to this analysis is whether the principle of humanity permits support for harmful 
means to achieve a net reduction and prevention of suffering for the civilian population.  Given 
the common practice of carrying out programs that put staff or partners at risk, or that carry a 
non-negligible risk of aid diversion to armed groups, “do no harm” probably does not mean, “do 
not take any action that is likely to result in harm,” but rather “do less harm.”  Therefore, there 
may be circumstances under which a humanitarian organization might publicly support or 
oppose the use of force while not running afoul of the principle of humanity.  Indeed, an 
organization’s own interpretation of the principle may, in the context of its other commitments, 
strongly compel it to take a public position.  
 
B. Implications for the Principle of Impartiality  
 
The principle of impartiality is fundamentally operational in nature; and as such, public 
statements for or against the use of force may have consequences for an organization’s reputation 
as an impartial actor, but it is unlikely that adopting such a position would violate an 
organization’s impartiality.  A humanitarian organization, whether it is a neutral or non-neutral, 
may make a statement as to whether it thinks the use of force is advisable while still conducting 
relief operations in a manner that is non-discriminatory, proportional to the demonstrated need of 
the beneficiaries, and free of any subjective distinctions concerning those receiving the 
assistance.  Thus, to the extent that an organization must consider implications for the principle 
                                                 
43
 See UNICEF’s Humanitarian Principles, UNICEF (July 2003).  
44
 See, e.g., UNICEF’s Humanitarian Principles; Jennifer Rubenstein, Between Samaritans and States: The Political 
Ethics of Humanitarian NGOs, Oxford (2015).  
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 of impartiality, its primary concern would likely be whether actors – specifically parties to the 
conflict – still perceive the organization as acting impartially. 
 
C. Implications for the Principle of Independence  
 
The principle of independence may be compromised if a humanitarian organization, by adopting 
a public position concerning the use of force, does so as a result of being influenced by the 
political, military, or financial motivations of a third party.  This becomes particularly acute if a 
state is a key donor of that organization.  If a humanitarian organization (neutral or non-neutral) 
takes a public position on the use of force, and does so independent of any influence from a state, 
then strictly speaking, the principle of independence is not compromised.  Whether the principle 
of independence is technically respected is of course important, but perhaps even more so is the 
issue of whether a humanitarian organization is perceived as acting independently.  As a result, 
even if a humanitarian organization is not allowing itself to be influenced by a third party, it 
should still consider whether they appear to be swayed in any way when adopting a public 
position concerning the use of force.  Transparency in terms of the grounds for adopting such a 
position would be important in demonstrating freedom from any outside pressure.   
 
D. Implications for the Principle of Neutrality 
 
For humanitarian organizations that have adopted the principle of neutrality, taking a public 
position concerning the use of force puts their adherence to the principle at risk.  With the 
notable exception of the ICRC,45 the consequences of violating the principle of neutrality are not 
legal, but political and operational.  Supporting or opposing the use of force would likely always 
align a humanitarian organization with one side of a conflict, violating the ideological prong of 
the neutrality principle.  This could compromise the organization’s reputation and its ability to 
conduct effective relief operations.  However, if communities served by humanitarian 
organizations are widely in favor or opposed to the use of force, an organization may actually 
enhance its reputation and strengthen its case for acceptance by speaking out.    
 
The principle of neutrality is not tantamount to a requirement of silence and does not require that 
its adherents remain quiet in all circumstances.  As one author explained “[neutrality] means 
keeping quiet when to say anything would inflame passions and provide material for propaganda 
without doing any good to the victims [that the organization] is trying to help.”46  Neutrality 
requires that an organization remain neutral as to the parties involved in the conflict – but not to 
the suffering the organization is trying to combat.47  The rarity with which the ICRC makes 
                                                 
45
 The ICRC statute, an international agreement, commits it to neutrality. 
46
 Harroff-Tavel, supra note 39, at 540.  
47
 Id. at 539. The ICRC does, however, publicly denounce violations of IHL on occasion.  Four conditions have been 
named as needing to be fulfilled before the ICRC will consider such a public statement: 
1.  The violations (torture, bombing of shelling of civilians, attacks on refugee camps, attacks on hospitals 
or Red Cross/Red Crescent personnel, etc.) are major and repeated; 
2.  The steps taken confidentially [by the ICRC] have not succeeded in putting an end to the violations; 
3.  Such publicity is in the interest of the persons or populations affected or threatened;  
4.  The ICRC delegates have witnessed the violations with their own eyes, or the existence and extent of 
those breaches were established by reliable and verifiable sources.47 
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 pronouncements concerning violations of IHL is notable, and has been criticized as unacceptable 
silence in the face of egregious violations of IHL.48  The ICRC explains that its infrequent use of 
public statements is twofold: “it does not want to risk losing its access to the victims of conflict 
by doing so, and it has reservations about the extent to which public declarations can mobilize 
opinion.”49 
 
While the principle of neutrality does not demand silence, it may not permit humanitarian 
organizations to adopt a position on the use of force.  As a threshold matter, the neutral 
organization must first determine if taking such a position would fundamentally align it with the 
military interests of one party or another.  It is almost impossible to envision a scenario in which 
supporting one party’s use of force would not result in the support of that party’s military 
objective, and conversely, it seems equally unlikely to conceive a scenario in which opposing a 
party’s use of force would not result in opposition to its military objective.  Though it cannot be 
said definitively whether any such circumstances exist, it bears reaffirming that neutral 
organizations are always free to advocate generally for the non-violent resolution of disputes.  
 
IV.    How Do Organizations Decide When to Speak Out? 
 
Public debate on the use of force often takes place through the lens of “humanitarian 
intervention” or the “Responsibility to Protect,” a normative framework endorsed by the U.N. 
General Assembly 50  and since elaborated by the U.N. Secretary General and his Special 
Representative on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect.51  A detailed 
treatment of this debate is beyond the scope of this article, but it is essential to note the frequent 
appeal by proponents and opponents of the use of force to humanitarian principles (in particular, 
the principle of humanity) and the aims of the U.N. Charter (in particular, “fundamental human 
rights”).52   It is common for states purporting to act in self-defense, or in the interests of 
collective security, to claim that the use of force will serve humanitarian interests.  It is equally 
common for peace movements to oppose the use of force on humanitarian grounds.  The moral 
                                                                                                                                                             
It is understood that in denouncing violations the ICRC is simply stating publicly a set of facts, such as “a hospital, 
which has special protection under IHL, was bombed by x party, on y date, resulting in z number of casualties.”  
These requirements may prove helpful by way of analogy in assessing whether there are any circumstances in which 
a humanitarian organization may adopt a public position on the use of force ad bellum.   
48
 For discussion of these critiques, and responses to them, See Jakob Kellenberger, Speaking Out or Remaining 
Silent in Humanitarian Work, 86 International Review of the Red Cross (2004); Rony Brauman, Médecins Sans 
Frontières and the ICRC: Matters of Principle, 94 International Review of the Red Cross (2012); Plattner, supra 
note 33, at 4. 
49
 Jakob Kellenberger, supra note 48, at 601. 
50
 G.A. Res. 2005 World Summit Outcome A/RES/60/1, para. 138-140 (Oct. 24, 2005).  
51
 The three pillars of the responsibility to protect assert that (1) the state bears the primary responsibility for 
protecting their populations; (2) the international community has a responsibility to encourage and assist states in 
fulfilling this responsibility; and (3) the international community has a responsibility use appropriate diplomatic, 
humanitarian and other means to protect the civilian population.  In the event a state is clearly failing to protect its 
population, the international community is called upon to take collective action to protect the population, in 
accordance with the UN Charter. U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, U.N. Doc. 
A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009). 
52
 In the case of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, See Full Text: Tony Blair’s Speech, The Guardian (18 Mar. 2003) 
available at http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/mar/18/foreignpolicy.iraq1; See also War With Iraq: Take 2, 
Friends Committee on National Legislation, February, 2003, available at 
http://fcnl.org/resources/newsletter/feb03/war_with_iraq__take_2.  
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 force of humanitarianism as a political, if not legal, rationale for or against the use of force is 
strong.  Given their allegiance to humanitarian principles and their presence on the ground in 
conflict areas, humanitarian organizations are ideally placed to shape these debates should they 
choose to do so. 
 
As discussed earlier, humanitarian organizations rarely make or criticize calls to arms.53  Each 
organization appropriately makes its own decision on whether to speak out or not based on its 
own specific commitments, circumstances, and analysis; some factors, however, should be 
common to most organizations’ decision-making processes.  What follows is a non-exhaustive 
list of factors that organizations should, and in some cases may, consider when deciding whether 
or not to adopt a public position vis-à-vis the proposed use of force.    
 
A. Humanitarian Principles  
 
As discussed, the principle of humanity should compel humanitarian organizations to attempt to 
reduce or prevent suffering wherever and however they can; this includes attempting to influence 
consequential policy decisions for the civilian population.  Organizations that take a rights-based 
approach may be particularly compelled to speak out.  However, the principle of neutrality may 
severely limit what organizations that subscribe to it can say.  Each organization must 
individually consider its commitment to and interpretation of the humanitarian principles.    
 
B. Balance of Harms 
 
In connection to an organization’s commitment to the principle of humanity, they must consider 
whether the use of force is likely to create or reduce suffering.  This is a challenging assessment 
to make, and it is made even more challenging by the need to consider all the indirect 
consequences of the conflict and its variable impacts based on age, gender, ethnicity, and a host 
of other factors.  Organizations will generally refrain from speaking out unless they have a high 
degree of confidence in their analysis on this central and extremely difficult issue. 
  
C. Legality 
 
Humanitarian organizations may, but need not, believe that strengthening compliance with the 
international law on the use of force, known as the jus ad bellum, generally reduces suffering and 
protects civilians by ensuring a stable and regulated system of peace and collective security.  The 
jus ad bellum is reflected in the United Nations Charter.54  The general prohibition against “the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of another state,” 
expressed in Article 2(4), has been confirmed as a rule of customary international law by the 
                                                 
53
 Oxfam has notably spoken out on the use of force on a number of occasions, such as support for intervention in 
Rwanda (1994) and Liberia (2003) and opposition in Iraq (2003) and Syria (2013). See Edmund Cairns, R2P and 
Humanitarian Action, Global Responsibility to Protect, 6 (2014); See also Working Toward Peace in Syria: Answers 
to Your Questions, Oxfam, (5 Sep. 2013), available at http://www.oxfamamerica.org/explore/stories/working-
toward-peace-in-syria-answers-to-your-questions.   
54
 This is distinct from international humanitarian law, or the jus in bello, which regulates the use of force during 
armed conflict.  The jus ad bellum concerns the legality of the recourse to force, while the jus in bello regulates the 
legality of the actions of the belligerents during a conflict, irrespective of whether the initial recourse to force was 
legal.  
12
International Human Rights Law Journal, Vol. 1 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://via.library.depaul.edu/ihrlj/vol1/iss1/3
 International Court of Justice and is believed by some scholars to have risen to the level of a jus 
cogens rule.55  The U.N. Charter also lays out exceptions to the general prohibition.  Article 51 
states that nothing in the Charter impairs the right of states to individual or collective self-
defense, and Chapter VII gives the U.N. Security Council the right to authorize military 
measures in order to restore international peace and security.56  Some scholars contend that the 
use of force to prevent or mitigate a humanitarian crisis may be lawful even absent Security 
Council authorization or a self-defense rationale;57 while this is certainly the minority view, it 
again demonstrates the appeal of humanitarian rhetoric in use of force debates. 
 
Due to their privileged status under IHL, as well as the protective and supportive provisions of 
that framework, along with international human rights law and international refugee law, 
humanitarian NGOs have an additional incentive to ensure respect for international law 
generally, even though they are not bound by it.  Bearing in mind the contentious legal debate 
that often surrounds the use of force, it is useful to consider how organizations might view cases 
where the question of legality is more or less settled. 
 
When the use of force is clearly unlawful, organizations will generally be inclined to oppose it, 
since most unlawful uses of force will cause civilian suffering for no legitimate purpose.  When 
the purpose of the proposed action is humanitarian in nature (and a humanitarian organization 
agrees that the action would indeed be appropriate if authorized by the Security Council) the 
organization faces a difficult dilemma.  In such instances, organizations are forced to choose 
between opposing an illegal use of force, supporting an “illegal but legitimate” action,58 or 
adopting the view that a bona fide humanitarian intervention – which under certain 
circumstances requires no Security Council authorization – in situations like this, silence is, of 
course, an attractive option.  
 
When the use of force is clearly lawful and aims to protect civilians, organizations may consider 
supporting it.  Organizations will face a difficult dilemma, however, if they believe that a lawful 
use of force will cause extraordinary civilian harm while reducing little.  Humanitarian 
organizations have a duty to prevent the suffering of innocent populations, but opposing the use 
of force in a case like this would require them to assess the gravity and significance of a state’s 
self-defense interest or the international community’s collective security interest, which they are 
                                                 
55
 U.N. Charter, Art. 2(4).  See, e.g., Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua (Merits), I.C.J. Reports 187-190 (27 June 1986); Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities 
in and Against Nicaragua (Merits) (Separate opinion of Judge Singh), I.C.J. Reports 153 (27 June 1986).  A jus 
cogens rule is “a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from 
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law 
having the same character.” See also Art. 54, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. 
56
 See U.N. Charter, arts. 39-51.  
57
 See, e.g., Fernando R. Tesón, The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention, Humanitarian Intervention: 
Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas (2003).   
58
 The Kosovo Report, presented to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, concluded that NATO’s air campaign in 
Kosovo was “illegal but legitimate.” See The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned, 
Independent International Commission on Kosovo, Oxford, (2000), available at 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/6D26FF88119644CFC1256989005CD392-
thekosovoreport.pdf. 
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 poorly positioned to do (unless the collective security interest, as announced by the Security 
Council, is related to civilian protection).  
 
D. Views of the Affected Population 
 
The Inter-Agency Steering Committee (“IASC”), a coordinating body for the U.N.-led 
humanitarian system that includes some major international humanitarian NGOs, confirmed in 
2011 that humanitarian organizations should hold themselves accountable to affected populations 
(“AAP”), an attitude widely held in the humanitarian community.59  One of the IASC’s five AAP 
commitments, on “participation,” states that humanitarians should “enable affected populations 
to play an active role in the decision-making processes that affect them.60  As it relates to the 
topic at hand, this means that humanitarians have committed to ensure that affected populations 
are able to influence the organization’s position concerning whether or not force should be used.  
Some humanitarians may view the AAP commitments as a requirement to also incorporate the 
views of affected populations into their own advocacy efforts. 
 
In practice, incorporating affected voices into the debate on the use of force is extraordinarily 
difficult.  Affected populations are composed of individuals with different opinions whose views 
are shaped by their unique experiences and intersectional identities, meaning that general 
consensus in an affected population is rare.  Attempting to conclude whether the population 
supports or opposes the use of force requires humanitarian organizations to define who is most 
vulnerable and affected at the time the decision to use force is made, as well as who would be 
most vulnerable and affected in the future if force is used or not used.  All of this assumes that 
humanitarian organizations have the capacity and access to ask persons across all or most of an 
affected area, which they often do not.  None of these limitations should inhibit an organization 
from making its best effort to understand and be faithful to local opinion, but organizations 
should take care to not to express a view on the use of force if they do not have a decent 
understanding of what the affected people want.   
 
E. Objectives of the Use of Force 
 
Though the term “humanitarian intervention” is used commonly to describe military actions 
against oppressive states, a military operation that actually conforms to the principle of humanity 
and the humanitarian imperative must be narrowly tailored to preventing or relieving suffering 
and must also be carried out in concert with non-military measures designed to maximize the 
protection of and relief for civilians.  For purposes of this article, it must be noted that principled 
humanitarian organizations will be reluctant to vocally support the use of force when its principal 
stated objective is not directly related to protection of civilians or the relief of civilian suffering.  
Conversely, humanitarian organizations will be more likely to vocally oppose the use of force 
when the stated military objective is inherently criminal, such as the killing or forcible 
displacement of a civilian population.  
 
                                                 
59
 Accountability to Affected Populations: IASC Commitments (CAAP), The AAP Operational Framework, 11, 
available at http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/downloaddoc.aspx?docID=6632&type=pdf  
60
 Id.   
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 Complicating the equation is the fact that parties to armed conflict nearly always have mixed 
motives for engaging in hostilities and rarely explicate them completely.  Self-defense actions 
may well be partially motivated by humanitarian concerns for foreign populations; just as U.N. 
peacekeeping missions whose central mandate is the protection of civilians.61  Humanitarian 
organizations must take care to analyze the interests of all the parties involved in order to 
determine the objective that military force is actually intended to achieve.  
 
F. Precautionary and Limiting Principles 
 
A number of the factors considered thus far, from a humanitarian organization’s point of view, 
are related to the criteria outlined for the just use of force in the report of the International 
Commission on Intervention on State Sovereignty (ICISS Report).62  If the above criteria is met 
in the affirmative, in other words, the use of force in a given situation would be legal so long as it 
was narrowly tailored to humanitarian objective, (related to the ICISS criterion of “right 
intention”), desired by the population (also discussed under “right intention”), and likely to 
reduce harm (related to “reasonable prospects”).  The criteria should be considered together as 
limiting and precautionary principles. 
 
According to ICISS, the use of force is only appropriate in response to:  
- large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent 
or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state 
neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or  
- large scale “ethnic cleansing,” actual or apprehended, whether 
carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.63 
 
The scale and gravity requirement, which ICISS refers to as “just cause,” is a threshold 
condition. Humanitarian organizations generally should not support the use of force in response 
to a situation less dire than those described above.  
 
Humanitarian organizations will also be interested in whether the proposed use of force would be 
proportional and whether there are any peaceful alternatives to fighting that might reasonably 
succeed in achieving the humanitarian objective exist (these are the two remaining requirements 
contained in the ICISS Report).  
 
G. Operational Consequences and Potential Impact 
 
Speaking out on the use of force, even for non-neutral humanitarian organizations, may put at 
risk the trust of local populations as well as the parties to the armed conflict – and their trust is 
necessary in order to operate impartially and effectively.  Equally important, is the safety of the 
organization’s staff and the staff of its local partner organizations, which can also be 
                                                 
61
 The Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty suggest that the motives 
behind unilateral military operations should be viewed with more skepticism than multilateral operations. See The 
Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Canadian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 36 (2001). 
62
 Id.  The full list of threshold criteria are: just cause; right intention; last resort; proportional means; reasonable 
prospects; and right authority.  
63
 Id.  
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 compromised as a result of the organization speaking out on the use of force.  Organizations 
must compare the impact they believe they can achieve by speaking out to the risks they would 
create for their staff, partners, and programs, as well as the populations they seek to assist.  Each 
organization should make its decision to speak out based on its tolerance for risk and the value it 
places on advocacy versus programming. 
 
V.   Conclusion 
 
Humanitarian organizations are guided by a host of legal, policy, and operational considerations; 
many which seem to militate against taking public positions on the use of force. Notwithstanding 
these apparent restrictions, humanitarian organization may sometimes consider it appropriate to 
publicly voice their support for, or opposition to, the use of force.  NGOs are essentially free 
from legal obligation in making this determination, and the weight they assign to various factors 
will (and must) be unique to each organization; and will likely be guided by the organization’s 
humanitarian commitments, values, and best judgment.  
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